The Upcoming Elections: Insistence on Further Defeat
Ensafali Hedayat
February 3rd, 2008
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The Eighth Majles election activities by those inside the Islamic Republic regime and those on the fringe of the regime are focused on limiting Iran’s socio-political alliances to these two groups. In this way, the fate of Iran’s future is placed on the doorstep of the so-called “Reformists.” In this atmosphere, an examination of the views and performance of the Reformists becomes especially important. This brief analysis is limited to the dealings of the Reformists with the Velayat-e Faqih, or Supreme Leadership. Hopefully, others will also pay attention to this issue and investigate it from other angles.
Regardless of the events and debates of the last decade, the question of whether the Islamic Republic can be reformed structurally remains unanswered. Is it possible for political parties and the Iranian people, or institutions outside the country, to transform the structure of this regime through democratic means? Activists and politicians such as former President Khatami, and political parties such as the Islamic Participation Front, the Organization of the Mojahedin, the Islamic Labor Party, Religious Nationalists, the Freedom Movement of Iran, the National Front of Iran, etc., support reforming the Islamic Republic through democratic means. But where do reformists stand on this question?
Are democratic reforms in Iran possible, within the framework of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution?
Reformists offer a variety of responses to this question. Some believe that it is possible to reform a regime based on the concept of Islamic Jurisprudence. This interpretation argues that as long as moderate candidates take control of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, peaceful reform can occur. They believe in partial reform through the acquisition of a larger share of the governing power for themselves. Since they are part of the system, ensuring their own survival is more important than a structural transformation of the regime.
The majority of those who subscribe to this view accept the Islamic Republic’s regime and its 1979 Constitution as legitimate. As for the accountability of the Leadership and related government institutions, they view these through this same prism. Some believe that if the Leader can be convinced to relinquish a minimum amount of his power, the country will move towards positive reforms.
In general, those who support the present regime (whether they are known as “Reformists” or “fundamentalists”) have two opinions about the Velayat-e Faqih. One views the responsibilities of the Islamic Jurist, as mentioned in the Constitution, as a baseline from which to operate. They argue that the responsibilities mentioned in the Constitution reflect the minimum power of the leader and that he has the right to expand his sphere of influence to whatever affairs he deems necessary, even if the Constitution does not explicitly mention them.
The other views the responsibilities of the Leader mentioned in the Constitution as the upper limit of his powers. They argue that the Constitution clearly states the boundaries of governance for the Leader and all legal institutions, and that it is illegal to go beyond these guidelines.
The first group argues for an Absolute Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and maintains that the Guardianship should include all issues pertaining to public affairs and governance, and that accountability of all political institutions is derived from this Leader. According to this view, the Islamic Jurist is at the height of power and represents God and the Hidden Imam on earth, or at least in Iran. He must pave the way for the appearance and rule of the 12th Shi’a Imam, Mehdi. He thus assumes permanent and absolute power as delegated to him by God and the Prophet of Islam. He is not elected by the people and it is not possible to limit his power through laws or the will of the people. He is the only person who can even intervene in the commandments of God himself and interpret them according to the requirements of time and place.
According to this group of supporters of the Islamic Jurists, the people and their vote should not be taken seriously. The right to legislate should not be vested in the representatives of the people. The powers of representatives should be limited to advising the Leader or the Hidden Imam. Only the Hidden Imam is innocent and without fault. During the period of the Hidden Imam’s absence, the responsibility of governing falls upon his representative within Muslim Shi’a societies, otherwise known as the Vali-ye Faqih or “Guardian Jurist,” who is a cleric knowledgeable in the affairs of religion and the world. Thus, the legitimacy of the Vali-ye Faqih is derived from the Hidden Imam, and in this way, he too can assume the unlimited powers of the Imam. Even the Vali-ye Faqih himself cannot limit his own current powers, or the future powers of the Hidden Imam, by enabling the people to elect this leader or Caliph.
From this viewpoint, a “Leader” in the Islamic Republic is “holy.” The people are his subjects and all their affairs are administered to under his approval. Just as no law can limit the powers of the Hidden Imam, no law can curtail the area of absolute influence that the Jurist possesses. Thus, what is mentioned in the Constitution is only a base from which the Jurist can operate without restriction. All institutions and organizations derive their authority through him. He alone can delegate his duties to others, through legal or personal means, and can just as easily revoke their legal responsibilities.
Another group of scholars of the Islamic Republic, especially those who have been deprived of its benefits for a while now, contend that the sphere of the leader’s power and influence should be limited to the pre-determined set of laws mentioned in the Constitution. They call for the reigning in of the absolute powers of the leader with the intention of advancing their own political, social, and economic preferences or those of their supporters. They maintain that the accountability of all government institutions, and the Constitution itself, should originate from the will of the people. In the opinion of this group, the votes that legitimized the 1979 Constitution and the institutions that came out of it are a reflection of popular will. Each one of those institutions and organizations owes its authority to the people, and if the people should will it, they should have the capacity to revoke this authority and that of the Constitution as well.
According to this group, the Iranian people have determined the extent of the country’s institutional powers, through their representatives, and the powers of the leader are not excluded from this principle either. He too derives his authority from the people and the law and must accept the boundaries that the people have established for him. Otherwise, he is acting illegally.
From this viewpoint, the leader does not have sacred powers. He is neither the representative of God on earth or among Muslims and Iranians, nor is he the representative of the Hidden Imam. His will is not absolute. As a representative of the people and chosen by him, he is accountable to them, as according to the same law, the people can revoke his authority whenever they see fit. For this reason, the people are more vigilant of the Leader than of any other government institution, because his excessive powers have led to corruption. The Assembly of Experts meets annually to review the leader’s performance and to assess the competence of the Leader to manage the affairs of the country and can remove the leader from office if they find he is unable to execute his duties.
To which of the two schools of thought do Reformists who support the regime subscribe?
In principle, the current Reformists should belong to the second group who view the people’s vote as the main factor in granting legitimacy. However, this is not generally the case. At the very least, the most important and influential branch of the Reformists do not practice their own stated theories and perspectives, because they do not view them as either acceptable or practical. Some even accept parts of the theory of the “Caliphate and succession of the Hidden Imam.” One branch of Iranian Reformists might privately disagree with the unlimited powers of the leadership, but they do not show it in practice. In speeches, in adopting official positions on issues, in negotiations and political acts, they grant full authority to the Jurist so that they too can gain legitimacy under his shadow. They do this so that they will not be eliminated, arrested, imprisoned, or assassinated and so that they will not lose all their political assets. They will manipulate the Leader and society along with it, to ensure their own safety within the system.
However, the Leadership is well aware of their theoretical ideas and agendas and knows not to trust them. The Leader’s “confidence” is something that all political groups in Iran are currently seeking. They want to convince him that they are more trustworthy than the others. Government Reformists also participate in this competition. Those that operate on the sidelines, like the Religious-Nationalists, the National Front of Iran, the Freedom Party, Iran Solidarity Party, followers of Allameh Tabatabai, student organizations, etc., openly oppose with the concept of the “Guardian Jurist” and demand the Constitution be altered, not just reformed. They intend to remove the leader and work towards empowering democratic institutions and have devised an agenda to fulfill these goals. To modify the Constitution, they collect signatures and have demanded a “Constitutional Referendum.” They have also boycotted parliamentary and presidential elections to avoid legitimizing the current situation.
However, the Reformists who work within or on the fringe of the government and want to gain a larger share of power for themselves are either cooperating with the existing system or are demanding only minor and superficial reforms. They encourage the people to participate in elections. They view the “boycotters” as unreasonable, disagree with the Constitutional Referendum, and oppose demonstrations by students and other groups. On these topics, they support the Leader and they actively resist answering the question of “how far can reform progress with full participation in parliamentary and presidential elections.”
Based on this, “Government Reformists” in Iran are not true Reformists and do not represent the will of the people. They switch sides between the government and other political movements within civil society. They deceive both groups for their own benefit. It is for this reason that they create “prerequisites” for their own political activity: if the possibility for fair negotiations exists, if the other faction does not wish to eliminate everyone, if our candidates are not removed, if…, if…, then we will boycott the elections. However, when the rival group did not take their demands seriously and called their bluff, they declared, “We will not boycott the elections but we will not participate in them either…”
Reformist groups, whose candidates were vetoed, issued this joint statement: “The executive committees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the supervisory committees of the Guardian Council not only rejected thousands of Iranians from candidacy, but also vetoed current and previous representatives of the Majles, along with former cabinet members.”
Government Reformists who seek a larger share of power within the current system, seek an opportunity to gain control through threats, the creation of hope among rivals, and the exploitation of the rivals’ desire for maintaining authority. However, the conservative elements in government are familiar with these tactics and are ready for counter-measures. They have seen the methods of the Reformists and are aware of the limits of their capacity, how far they are willing to go, and at what point their threats are no longer viable.
Conservatives have figured out that the Reformists too derive their legitimacy, not from the people, but from the Leader and are thus indebted to him for their existence and any power they may exercise within government.
The rival faction is aware that the Reformists do not depend on the people for their legitimacy and are limited in how far they will go in threatening their opponents. The Reformists know that they are losers in this game, but they are determined to retain as much of their power as possible. They do not want to be accused of “sedition” and of planning the overthrow of the government.
Negotiations and compromises leading to a positive turn of events could occur if Conservatives and right-wing groups, and even the Revolutionary Guard, sense that Reformists are serious in their political demands. This could occur if they see that Reformists are changing their strategies and tactics away from current regime toward the people and are seeking the help of the people in achieving the larger goal of reform. However, the regime knows that Government Reformists have grown accustomed to an increasing number of defeats, have never used existing opportunities to advance the public will, and have no intention of reaching out to the Iranian people. They are also aware that Reformists outside the country lack confidence in their own powers and abilities and have lost morale. For this reason, they cannot count on the millions of Iranians who have in the past either boycotted or refused to participate in elections. Reformist politicians have concluded that reform from within the political system is impossible with the existence of the current Constitution and the presence of institutions under direct rule of the Leadership. They also believe that the occupation of Majles or the Presidential stronghold will have no effect on the current political balance of power within Iran. Yet they are still wary of large-scale change and revolutionary developments.
We can now ask the Reformists: since we fear revolution and the possibility of violent clashes and bloodshed, since we fear foreign military intervention, then how should we respond to peaceful and non-violent modes of change? How long are we willing to support peaceful resistance on the part of the people and social movements in dealing with “the powers from above?” In other words, what will our fate be if we continue to fear freedom of information and the widespread influence of media; or if we fear, in the words of the Leader, “cultural hegemony by foreigners;” if we fear the support of foreign governments and institutions in spreading democratic ideals among the people and more specifically the younger generation; and if international support for this trend is more a matter of shame than pride for us? Is our fate to surrender to increasing failure and should we not at some point end this unremitting trend of defeat?
Until now, various Reformist factions (whether linked to the government or expelled from it) have focused their activities on dealing with the Leader and powerful government institutions through threats of exposure and scare tactics using “the people” or “the international community.” These Reformists have failed, however, to develop an effective relationship with the people and have been indifferent to and incapable of shoring up support for their demands to their own advantage. In this game, the ruling elite have been in full control, and the Reformists have suffered defeat. Government Reformists fear the challenge and power posed by the magnitude of the people’s demands for significant changes to the structure of a regime that they essentially support, more than “violence and bloodshed.” Thus, Government Reformists have never been completely forthright with the people regarding their true intentions, and, in this way, they are determined to continue their policy of “surrender and defeat.” Unfortunately, this situation will carry on.
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Posted: February 3rd, 2008
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